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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0283
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0279

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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
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DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)

SUBJECT: GENEVA SFO-GVA-VIII: AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 11, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-037.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 11, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 11:30 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A meeting co-chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin on
proposed Agreed Statements was held at the Russian Mission on
February 11. The proposed Agreed Statements on Converted B-1B
Bombers and SSGNs were discussed in detail and the subject of SLBM
launcher conversion was reviewed. End summary.

[1](#)4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs;
and SLBM Launcher Conversion.

15. (S) Ilin noted no brackets remained in the opening paragraph of the Agreed Statement on Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers. Elliott corrected him and said the U.S. side had inserted the term "eliminated" inside its bracketed text in the opening paragraph to better capture the nature of the facilities covered in this Agreed Statement and that this change applied to the remainder of the document. Elliott added the U.S. side had altered its next bracketed text to read "the following provisions shall apply" to ensure the cited provisions from the Treaty applied to the remainder of the document. He stated a legal assessment of this text was needed. Ilin responded that adding the term "eliminated" to the bracketed text was an interesting change and he felt it might be acceptable, but the Russian side would need to review it. He agreed to let the legal representatives review the last bracketed text in the first paragraph.

16. (S) Discussing the bracketed text in paragraph 1(A), Ilin stated that "in accordance with" and "identical to" did not mean the same thing. Elliott concurred and clarified that the U.S. side had altered this sentence because there were certain scenarios where the procedures used to demonstrate that the B-1B was incapable of employing nuclear armaments might not be "identical

to" the procedures used in the exhibition of the B-1B and therefore the U.S. side would not be able to comply with this provision as written by the Russian side. Dr. Warner inquired why the term "in accordance with" was not acceptable. Ilin replied that "in accordance with" did not indicate to what extent the procedures would be followed. Mr. Brown recommended the word "analogous" or a similar term. The sides agreed to ask their respective lawyers to collaborate on an appropriate term.

17. (S) Elliott stated paragraph 1(A) had been altered to include "distinguishing features" in an effort to match the Russian intent to capture the purpose of the exhibition but that it failed to make sense in English. Ilin questioned why the brackets remained and explained that, without the bracketed text, the meaning of the paragraph would be lost. Elliott agreed to draft changes which retained the meaning of the paragraph yet made sense in both languages. Elliott explained that the United States was actively converting B-1B heavy bombers at the present time and understood that one B-1B would need to remain in its original state in order to meet the requirement detailed in paragraph 1(A). (Comment: the reference is to an exhibition of distinguishing characteristics for which one converted and one unconverted bomber would be needed. End comment.)

18. (S) Ilin stated paragraph 1(C) was agreed text. Elliott, Ilin and Warner discussed paragraph 1(D) and agreed that during the exhibition the demonstrating party would show the inspecting party that the converted item was incapable of delivering nuclear arms and the distinguishing features would be recorded for future use. During subsequent inspections of the converted items, the inspected party would demonstrate that the distinguishing features were present and the inspecting party would confirm this, thereby confirming that the converted item had not been reconverted and remained incapable of delivering nuclear arms. Elliott agreed to rewrite the paragraph to ensure this concept was captured.

19. (S) Elliott stated that paragraph 1(D)(i) remained bracketed and Warner stated this paragraph was being reviewed for placement in the General Provisions Part of the Protocol which would make it applicable to all inspection activities.

U.S. SSGN

¶10. (S) Ilin declared that the brackets in the first paragraph and paragraph 1(A) of the Agreed Statement on SSGNs converted from SSBNs would be resolved if the same issues on the B-1B Agreed Statement were resolved. Ilin said paragraph 1(B) still required revision to include locations of not only SSGNs but also SSBNs on the Coastlines and Waters diagrams. Elliott agreed to make that revision. Ilin continued that paragraph 1(C)(i) of the United States version was acceptable but that the last sentence was

unnecessary. Elliott agreed to send a revised proposal.

SLBM Launcher conversions

¶11. (S) Regarding SLBM launcher conversions, Ilin said the Russian side had many questions on this topic, including how such a conversion was possible, how often it would occur, for what purpose it would be conducted and the time period in which the conversion would take place. Adm (ret.) Kuznetsov interjected that while the Conversion and Elimination Protocol for submarine launcher conversions was nearly complete, the Protocol only covered conversion to a new type of SLBM. Elliott disagreed and explained that this topic had been covered in detail with Col Ryzhkov and the U.S. side had made it clear throughout the negotiations what the United States position on this matter was. Elliott continued that he had on several occasions explained that, since the United States had constructed its submarines with 24 SLBM launchers, it would be required to convert some of its SLBM launchers in order to meet the new treaty's limits. He explained that these conversions, although the process had not been completely developed yet, must be such that the launcher was no longer capable of launching an SLBM. The procedures would be presented to the Bilateral Consultative Commission, a demonstration would be conducted and notification and subsequent opportunity for exhibition and inspection would be provided. Elliott reiterated that he had explained all this to Col Ryzhkov and given an explanation of the U.S. side's intent to convert two to four tubes on each of its 14 SSBNs. While there was no estimate available as to how long it would take to conduct the conversions, they would normally take place in conjunction with other major work on the submarine.

¶12. (S) Ilin inquired what the converted SLBM launchers or SSBNs would be used for. Elliott responded that the decision was not final on what the converted launchers would be used for, but it was likely storage or ballast. It was certain that enough of the launch system would be removed to require some structural work, he added. Ilin asked if the United States would provide to the Russian Federation, the purpose of the converted launchers. Elliott responded "yes." Gen Orlov asked if the U.S. side understood what problems it would face if it converted the launchers to employ other types of weapons and Elliott again responded "yes." Probing how long it would take to conduct the conversions, Ilin asked if it could take a month and Elliott responded that the details were not known but that the U.S. side had 7 years in which to conduct the conversions. The standard would be that the launchers would not be capable of launching SLBMs, as had been demonstrated to the Russian side during the conversions of the SSGNs. Ilin requested written responses to a list of questions on the topic. (Begin note. The

list of questions was provided on February 15. End note.) Elliott agreed that he would provide written responses.

¶13. (U) Documents provided: None.

¶14. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Elliott

Mr. Ahlm (RO)

Mr. Albertson

Mr. Brown

Lt Col Goodman

LTC Litterini

Amb Ries

Mr. Trout

Dr. Warner

Mrs. Zdravecky

Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIAN

Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Mr. Luchaninov

Gen Orlov

Gen Poznihir

Gen Venevtsev

Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING